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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1986 the Supreme Court of Ohio acknowledged that "participating
in the work force, in and of itself, is a stressful activity."' Recent national
studies have confirmed that workplace stress knows no occupational
boundaries and, moreover, threatens the psychological well-being of the
United States work force. 2 Job-related mental stress exacts a toll on both
* Assistant Attorney General, Workers' Compensation Section, Office of At-
torney General Lee Fisher.
Ryan v. Connor, 503 N.E.2d 1379, 1382 (Ohio 1986).
2See U.S. DEPT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., PROPOSED NATIONAL STRATEGY
FOR THE PREVENTION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL DISORDERS, PUB. No. 89-137 (1988). This
publication reports that occupational involvement in psychological disorders is
not a matter of dispute in the mental health community. See 20 O.S.H. Reo.
(BNA), No. 25, 1043-44 (Nov. 21, 1990). This article highlights a research institute
survey by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health which found
that psychosocial factors such as social environment at work and work content
affect all occupations and, therefore, the potential exposure to health risks is
"ubiquitous." See also 20 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA), No. 49, 1699-1700 (May 15, 1991).
This article reports a study by the Minneapolis-based Northwestern Life Insur-
ance Company, finding that one out of three U.S. workers thought seriously about
quitting work in 1990 due to workplace stress, and the same number feared job
burnout in the next year or two.
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worker health and productivity,3 and the effects of such stress are fre-
quently more devastating than physical industrial injuries.4 In short,
workplaces are becoming mine fields of stress, endangering the physical
and mental health of today's workers.
Undoubtedly because of the increase and prevalance of workplace
stress, the incidence of workers' compensation claims related to such
stress has exploded nationwide. In 1988, stress-related workers' compen-
sation claims accounted for fourteen percent of all claims.5 In California
alone, 70,000 stress claims were filed in 1986.6 Stress-related claims are
expected to increase through the 1990s, 7 and recent commentators fear
that this predicted increase in stress-based claims will destroy some
states' workers' compensation systems.8 Because of the potential for fraud-
ulent claims and costly litigation, many states have moved to define and
limit the situations in which workers are eligible for stress-related ben-
efits. Limitations have come in the form of legislative enactments or
judicial decisions establishing specific requirements or restrictions re-
garding stress claims.
Given this background, the issue for workers, employers, lawyers, and
judges concerned with Ohio workers' compensation becomes: Under what
circumstances can a physical or mental condition that is related to mental
job stress be compensable under the workers' compensation law of Ohio?
This is the question addressed by this article.
II. THE OHIO WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT
In Ohio, workers are compensated for industrial injuries and diseases
by rights granted to them by statute.9 In 1911, the Ohio General Assembly
19 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 27, 1224-25 (Dec. 6, 1989). This article reports a
Center for Disease Control study that there is a substantial amount of empirical
evidence that people exposed to a high degree of job stress have greater deteri-
oration of overall health, more diseases of the upper respiratory tract, more al-
lergies, a greater incidence of hypertension, and a greater risk of cardiac death
and coronary heart disease. See also 11 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 45, 957 (Apr. 15,
1982). This article notes that a list of the 10 most serious occupational disease
and injury categories ranked by division directors at the National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health includes psychological disorders.
I See American Psychiatric Ass'n Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (3d ed. 1987). The DSM-IIIR classifies "psychosocial stressors," speci-
fying occupational stress, as a major diagnostic axis. See also Klimas v. Trans
Caribbean Airways, Inc., 176 N.E.2d 714, 716 (N.Y. 1961).
5 Christy L. DeVader & Andrea Giampetro-Meyer, Reducing Managerial Dis-
tress About Stress: An Analysis and Evaluation of Alternatives for Reducing
Stress-Based Workers' Compensation Claims, 31 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1, 5 (1990).
6 Roger Thompson, Fighting the High Cost of Worker's Comp, NATION'S Bus.,
Mar. 1990, at 28.
Id. at 28; See National Council on Compensation Insurance, Emotional Stress
in the Workplace-New Legal Rights in the 80's, 1985, at 7; William C. Nugent,
When Employees Seek Workers' Compensation for Stress, 14 EMPL. REL. L.J. 239,
251 (1988); DeVader & Giampetro-Meyer, supra note 5, at 5, 9.
See DeVader & Giampetro-Meyer, supra note 5, at 1.
See generally Van Fossen v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 522 N.E.2d 489 (Ohio
1988); Jenkins v. Keller, 216 N.E.2d 379 (Ohio 1966).
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first enacted law to compensate industrial injuries.'0 The current Ohio
Workers' Compensation Act ("Act") is contained in chapter 4123 of the
Ohio Revised Code ("O.R.C."). The remedy provided under the Act is the
exclusive remedy for an industrial injury, disease or bodily condition."
The burden of proving that a particular injury, disease, or bodily condition
is work-related falls upon the worker.1 2 However, by express statutory
provision, the terms of the Act are to be liberally construed in favor of
workers and dependents of deceased workers.'
3
The current Act allows compensation to workers in cases of injury,
occupational disease, or death, provided the same were not: (1) purposely
self-inflicted or (2) caused by intoxication or the influence of a controlled
substance not prescribed by a physician.14 An "injury" under the Act is
defined as follows:
(C) "Injury" includes any injury, whether caused by external
accidental means or accidental in character and result, received
in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee's
employment. "Injury" does not include:
(1) Psychiatric conditions except where the conditions have
arisen from an injury or occupational disease;
(2) Injury or disability caused primarily by the natural de-
terioration of tissue, an organ, or part of the body;
(3) Injury or disability incurred in voluntary participation
in an employer-sponsored recreation or fitness activity if the
employee signs a waiver of his right to compensation or benefits
under Chapter 4123 of the Revised Code prior to engaging in
the recreation or fitness activity."
The exclusion of psychiatric conditions from the definition of "injury"
came by legislative amendment in 1986.16 Due to this amendment, psy-
chiatric conditions cannot qualify as compensable injuries under the Act.
An "occupational disease" under the Act is defined:
As used in this section and Chapter 4123 of the Revised Code,
"occupational disease" means a disease contracted in the course
of employment, which by its causes and the characteristics of
its manifestation or the condition of the employment results
in a hazard which distinguishes the employment in character
from employment generally, and the employment creates a risk
of contracting the disease in greater degree and in a different
manner than the public in general."'
10 1911 Ohio Laws 524.
11 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.74 (Baldwin 1990) [hereinafter O.R.C.].
12 White Motor Corp. v. Moore, 357 N.E.2d 1069 (Ohio 1976); State ex rel. Gen.
Motors Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n, 327 N.E.2d 761 (Ohio 1975); Fox v. Indus.
Comm'n, 125 N.E.2d 1 (Ohio 1955).
1- O.R.C. § 4123.95
14 O.R.C. § 4123.54
15 O.R.C. § 4123.01(C).
16 See PHiLLIP J. FULTON, OHIO WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW § 7.3 n.65 (1991).
17 O.R.C. § 4123.68.
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The current definition of "occupational disease" is a codification of the
holding of the Supreme Court of Ohio in the 1975 case of State, ex rel.
Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Krise.'8 Unlike the definition of "injury," the
definition of "occupational disease" contains no express exclusion of psy-
chiatric conditions.
III. THREE KINDS OF STRESS CLAIMS
There are three types or categories of stress-related workers' compen-
sation claims. First, a worker could claim that a work-related physical
injury or disease caused a mental condition (physical-mental claim). Sec-
ond, a worker could allege that workplace stress caused a physical con-
dition (mental-physical claim). Third, a worker could contend that
workplace stress caused a mental condition (mental-mental claim). This
third category is the most controversial one nationwide19 and is currently
at issue before the Supreme Court of Ohio in two companion cases.
20
IV. PHYSICAL-MENTAL CLAIMS
Longstanding Ohio case law has allowed a mental condition resulting
from a physical industrial injury or occupational disease to be a com-
iS 327 N.E.2d 761, syllabus (Ohio 1975). The current definition of "occupational
disease" was enacted in 1986. Prior to that amendment, O.R.C. § 4123.68 set
forth a list or a schedule of occupational diseases and, in addition, contained a
catch-all provision which provided:
(BB) all other occupational diseases: A disease peculiar to a particular
industrial process, trade, or occupation and to which an employee is not
ordinarily subjected or exposed outside of or away from his employment.
The current O.R.C. § 4123.68 also contains a schedule of occupational diseases
considered compensable when contracted by an employee in the course of the
employment in which such employee was engaged and due to the nature of any
process described in O.R.C. § 4123.68. A disease which meets the definition of
occupational disease contained in the current O.R.C. § 4123.68 is compensable
even if not specifically listed in the current schedule of occupational diseases.
9 See 1B ARTHUR LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 42.23
(1991). It is also conceivable for a worker to claim that a combination of physical
injuries resulted in a mental condition, or that the effects of a physical injury
combined with mental job stress to produce another condition, either physical or
mental. For a discussion of the three basic types of stress claims, see LARSON, Id.
at § 42.20.
Rambaldo v. Accurate Die Casting, No. 58588 (Cuyahoga County Cty. Ct.
App. June 20, 1991), motion to certify overruled, 62 Ohio St. 3d 1456 (1991), reh'g
granted, 579 N.E.2d 1394 (1991); Rini v. City of East Cleveland, No. 58589 (Cuy-
ahoga County App. June 27, 1991), motion to certify overruled, 579 N.E.2d 1394,
reh'g granted, 579 N.E.2d 1394 (1991).
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pensable condition under the Act.21 In a typical physical-mental claim,
the worker initially files a claim with the Ohio Bureau of Workers' Com-
pensation for a physical injury. If this claim is allowed, the worker has
the right to participate in the Ohio Workers' Compensation Fund for a
physical injury to a specific part or parts of the body. Once the physical
claim is allowed, a worker can request that the claim be additionally
allowed for a mental condition, claiming that the previously-allowed
physical condition proximately caused the mental condition. It is not
uncommon for a time period of several years to elapse between the date
of the initial injury and the diagnosis of a related mental condition.
A classic example of this situation is found in Zavatsky v. Stringer,2 2 a
case most-often noted for its discussion and holdings regarding the topic
of "extent of disability" under O.R.C. § 4123.519.23 In Zavatsky, a worker,
Caroline Williams, had a claim originally allowed for a physical injury
described as "contusion of the scalp and abrasion of the left wrist." Three
years later, Williams requested that her claim be additionally allowed to
include a new medical condition described as "hysterical neurosis," al-
leging that this condition resulted from her initial physical injuries. The
Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation granted this request and specif-
ically ordered that the allowance of the claim be amended to include
"hysterical neurosis."
In its opinion in Zavatsky, the Supreme Court of Ohio commented on
the subject of additional allowances in Ohio workers' compensation
claims:
It is common knowledge that the vast majority of industrial
claims are not contested. They are recognized by the employer
and by the Bureau of Workers' Compensation as valid injuries
to specific parts of the body and for specific physical conditions.
21 See State ex rel. Buckeye Int'l, Inc. v. Indus. Comm'n, 436 N.E.2d 533 (Ohio
1982); State ex rel. Peeples v. Farley Paving Co., 420 N.E.2d 111 (Ohio 1981);
State ex rel. Anderson v. Indus. Comm'n, 404 N.E.2d 153 (Ohio 1980), rev'd on
other grounds, 584 N.E.2d 1032 (Ohio 1986); Zavatsky v. Stringer, 503 N.E.2d
1032 (Ohio 1978); State ex rel. Hatfield v. Indus. Comm'n, 165 N.E.2d 211 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1960); see also, Dunn v. Mayfield, 584 N.E.2d 37 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990).
Dunn held that a worker stated a cause of action under the Act for emotional
disability by alleging in his complaint both physical injury (cut fingers, burning
eyes and lungs) and emotional disability (posttraumatic stress syndrome) as being
proximately caused by physical assault on him as a correctional officer at the
hands of inmates. The court emphasized, however, that the worker faced "the
unenviable task" of proving that his posttraumatic stress syndrome was proxi-
mately caused by his cut fingers, burning eyes and lungs and not the emotional
stress from being held hostage by hostile inmates. Dunn, 584 N.E.2d at 41.
22 Zavatsky, 384 N.E.2d at 695.
21 The term "extent of disability" refers to the amount of benefits or compen-
sation due to a worker for an allowed injury or condition. See Zavatsky, 384 N.E.2d
at 695. See also State ex rel. Bosch v. Indus. Comm'n, 438 N.E.2d 415, 416 (Ohio
1982).
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After a claim is recognized as valid for such a specific physical
condition, claimants frequently allege that they also injured
another part of the body in the same industrial accident, or
allege that a physical condition, other than that originally
claimed, has developed from the original injury. For example,
a claimant with a recognized low back injury may later claim
that he has developed a heart condition, a psychoneurosis, ul-
cers, etc., as the result of his recognized injury. A claimant's
right to make such a claim is specifically recognized (R.C.
4123.84).24
It is interesting to note that the court, by this quoted language, apparently
considered the additional allowance of "hysterical nuerosis" by Williams
to be a physical condition resulting from her initial injury three years
earlier.
Despite the Zavatsky court's apparent misclassification of a neurosis
as a physical condition, the historical practice of the Ohio Bureau of
Workers' Compensation and the Industrial Commission of Ohio has been
to allow physical-mental claims if the worker shows that the mental
condition resulted from the previously-recognized physical injury or con-
dition. In 1986 the Ohio General Assembly gave its stamp of approval to
this historical practice by amending the definition of "injury" in O.R.C.
§ 4123.01(C) to exclude psychiatric conditions "except where the condi-
tions have arisen from an injury or occupational disease. '25 Thus, by
statute and by case law, a mental condition resulting from a physical
industrial injury or occupational disease is a compensable condition under
the workers' compensation law of Ohio.
Physical-mental claims are not without their pitfalls, however. Like
any claim involving mental disease, the authenticity of a mental condition
is determined largely on the basis of observed behavior and subjective
history; therefore, a mental condition is also subject to misdiagnosis and
is less readily challenged than the authenticity of a physical condition,
which often can be confirmed by physical and biological evidence. 26 Dr.
Phillip Resnick of Cleveland, Ohio, explains that although posttraumatic
stress disorders do occur as a result of traumatic events at work, there
is the possibility of malingered psychological symptoms after injury. How-
ever, "lalssessment of malingered psychiatric symptoms after traumatic
events is difficult because self-reports of subjective symptoms are difficult
to verify."27 Additionally, workers may engage in false imputation, mean-
ing that authentic psychiatric symptoms due in fact to stresses at home
may be falsely attributed to a traumatic event at work to gain compen-
24Zavatsky, 384 N.E.2d at 697.
25O.R.C. § 4123.01(C)(1).
26 See Phillip J. Resnick, Malingering of Posttraumatic Disorders, in CLINICAL
ASSESSMENT OF MALINGERING AND DECEPTION, 84, 85-86 (Richard Rogers, ed.,
1988).
' Id. at 103.
[Vol. 40:35
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sation. 28 In contrast, some individuals may have a mistaken belief or
genuine misperception that a relationship exists between an accident and
their psychological disability. 29
The primary motive for a worker to either (1) feign mental illness as
a result of a physical industrial injury or (2) falsely attribute a real mental
illness to an industrial injury becomes the opportunity for financial gain
in the form of additional workers' compensation benefits. Indeed, after
the workers' compensation claim is filed, Dr. Resnick advises that:
[tihe efforts of attorneys for both the plaintiff and defendant
may alter the patient's attitudes and the course of the illness.
The plaintiff's lawyer may over dramatize the client's impair-
ment to the point of being "a salesman of pain, sorrow, agony,
and suffering." In contrast, defense attorneys often assume an
attitude of disbelief and imply that the individual is not suf-
fering from any genuine psychiatric symptoms. Such litigants
may understandably become angry based on the belief they are
going to be cheated .
3
Consequently, there are several identifiable problems associated with
physical-mental claims: misdiagnosis, malingering, false imputation,
genuine misconception, and litigation. These problems are real and
should be kept in mind by those concerned with these types of claims.
Further, some or all of these same problems can be present in any kind
of stress-related claim for workers' compensation.
V. MENTAL-PHYSICAL CLAIMS
Mental-physical claims have been compensable under the Act since the
Supreme Court of Ohio's ruling in Ryan v. Connor,3' decided December
30, 1986. In a two-part syllabus, the court held:
1. A physical injury occasioned solely by mental or emotional
stress, received in the course of, and arising out of, an in-
jured employee's employment, is compensable under O.R.C.
§ 4123.01(C); and
2. In order for an injury occasioned solely by mental or emo-
tional stress to be compensable, the claimant must show
that the injury resulted from greater emotional strain or
tension than that to which all workers are occasionally sub-
jected.3 2
In the first part of this ruling, the court established that a physical injury
occasioned solely by mental job stress is a compensable workers' com-
18 Id. at 85.
29
/d.
11 Id. at 88 (citations omitted).
11 503 N.E.2d 1379 (Ohio 1986).32 Id.
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pensation claim in Ohio. In the second part of this ruling, the court
identified the type or degree ofjob stress required for a compensable claim
to occur: The injury must have resulted from greater emotional strain or
tension than that to which "all workers are occasionally subjected." 33 The
key words here are all and occasionally.
In Ryan, the worker had been employed with the same company for
over forty-five years when, at a meeting one afternoon, management
requested him to retire early.3 4 At a second meeting the same afternoon,
when the worker advised he did not want to retire, he was informed he
would be officially retired.3 5 Following this second meeting, the worker
returned home, allegedly under great stress, ashen and gray in color,
upset and agitated, and subject to physical shaking and trembling.3 6 That
night he was unable to sleep; the next day he experienced chest pains
while trimming some trees around his home.3 7 Shortly thereafter, he had
a heart attack and died.3
Prior to the Ryan decision, Ohio law denied workers' compensation to
workers sustaining distinct physical injuries from workplace stress. This
law, however, was a judicial limitation imposed by prior court decisions, 39
rather than a restriction imposed by the statutory definitions of "injury"
and "occupational disease," which made no distinction between physical
and mental conditions until the definition of "injury" was amended in
1986. In departing from prior precedent and deciding that a physical
injury occasioned solely by mental job stress can be compensable, the
Ryan court relied upon two main factors: (1) court decisions of other states,
which uniformly allow compensability when job-related mental stress
causes physical injury; and (2) medical advances confirming a direct link
between mental stress and physical disabilities. Noting that the plain
language of the definition of "injury" in O.R.C. § 4123.01(C) does not
restrict compensation only to those workers whose physical injuries re-
sulted from "contemporaneous physical injury or physical trauma," the
court stated that "it makes little sense to continue to impose a limitation
on compensation that is not expressly set forth in Ohio's Workers' Com-
pensation Act."4
0
What must a worker show to establish a mental-physical claim? Ryan
requires the worker to satisfy two separate tests. First, the worker must
show that the injury resulted from "greater emotional strain or tension
than that to which all workers are occasionally subjected" or, in other
words, "unusual" workplace stress.41 Therefore, a worker who sustains a
, Id. at 1380.
- Id.
35 Id.36 Ryan, 503 N.E.2d at 1380.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Szymanski v. Halle's, 407 N.E.2d 502 (Ohio 1980); Toth v. Standard Oil Co.,
113 N.E.2d 81 (Ohio 1953).
40 Ryan, 503 N.E.2d at 1381.
41 Id. at 1382.
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physical injury due to ordinary, everyday job stress will be denied com-
pensation for such a condition. Ohio law still denies recovery to these
types of workers (called "eggshell" claimants) because the stress which
caused their injuries is not legally sufficient to cause a compensable in-
jury. This first test is thus one of legal causation, relating to the type or
degree of stress which must be present at the workplace.
Why did the court draw this distinction between "usual" and "unusual"
stress? After all, the general rule in Ohio is that an employer takes a
worker "as he finds him" and assumes the risk of the worker having a
weakened condition becoming injured more easily than a healthy worker,
who may not be injured under the same circumstances. 42 Shouldn't this
rule apply to stress-caused physical injuries as well? The Ryan opinion
gives two clues to answer this puzzle. One, the court stated that mental-
physical claims are different in that the causation of a physical-contact
injury is usually more readily discernible than that of a stress-related
injury.43 And two, the court wrote that:
Because stress is experienced by every person in everyday
life, it is necessary to define what kind of mental or emotional
stress is legally sufficient to give rise to a compensable injury.
Much stress in the ... employment is simply a result of the
demands of functioning in our society, and participating in the
work force, in and of itself, is a stressful activity. In order for
a stress-related injury to be compensable, therefore, it must be
the result of mental or emotional stress that is, in some respect,
unusual. 44
By giving these two clues, the court revealed its concerns about (1) dif-
ficulties in proving that workplace stress, not stress from some other
source, caused the injury; and (2) too many claims for stress-related in-
juries. These concerns likely persuaded the court to adopt the test of
'unusual" workplace stress used by a number of other jurisdictions.
In sum, the first test of Ryan is an objective test, squarely focusing on
the stress experienced by all workers as a whole, not just to workers in
a particular occupation or profession. To satisfy this test, the worker must
distinguish the job stress at issue from the normal, everyday stress which
all workers experience from time to time. The test relates to the stress
itself, not to the worker's individualized or subjective response to the
stress.
Once the worker meets the first Ryan test of proving "unusual" work-
place stress, the worker must meet the second test of Ryan: The test of
medical causation which requires proving that the stress from employ-
ment was, in fact, the medical cause of the claimed injury.4 5 This is easier
42 Hamilton v. Keller, 229 N.E.2d 63 (Ohio 1967); see PHILLIP J. FULTON, OHIO
WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW § 7.4 (1991).
Ryan, 503 N.E.2d at 1381-82.
-Id.
"5 Id. at 1382.
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said than done in these types of cases. The worker must show by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that a direct or proximate causal relationship
existed between the job stress and the injury, or, in death cases, that the
death was accelerated by a substantial period of time as a direct and
proximate result of the job stress.46 This issue of causation is generally
relegated to the medical experts and the triers of fact and is determined
on a case-by-case basis.
47
Since Ryan, the Supreme Court of Ohio has not decided a case con-
cerning a stress-related claim for workers' compensation. Ryan was not
a unanimous decision by the court; there were strong dissenting opinions
by Justices Holmes and Wright. These dissents raised significant and
legitimate questions which the court may have to answer in future cases
involving mental-physical claims for workers' compensation. 48
Justice Holmes criticized the standard of "unusual" stress adopted by
the majority as imprecise and difficult to grasp. Moreover, discussions as
to changes in job duties, promotions, demotions, early retirement, or hir-
ings and firings are "hardly distinguishable from the ordinary experiences
of most human beings" and thus not properly a basis for compensation. 49
He also found inherent problems in showing causation whenever mental
stress was at issue. These concerns are well-stated by one paragraph in
his dissent:
[Tlhe standard enthroned by the majority, which measures the
"greater emotional strain or tension than that to which all
workers are occasionally subjected," is a far more imprecise
measure than that utilized up to the present. The terms "all
workers" and "occasionally subjected" are neither simple nor
easily ascertainable. Likewise, the degree to which one expe-
riences "emotional strain," i.e., stress, during times of decision,
is largely a matter of personal temperament. Because stress is
subjectively experienced, it is usually not, by itself, readily
ascertainable or quantifiable. While I have previously conceded
that stress may harm the body and may be found to be com-
pensable if occasioned by definite job activity, it must be pointed
out that no method presently exists to separate the stress al-
legedly engendered by some occurrence at the place of em-
ployment from the concomitant strain of consequential, non-
work-related anxieties which follow. Such vagueness un-
leashed can only result in a plethora of cases and claims, each




41 Ryan, 503 N.E.2d at 1385, 1387-88 (Holmes, J., and Wright, J., dissenting).
49 Id. at 1385 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
0 Id. at 1385-86 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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Justice Wright thought that the 1986 legislative amendment, which
excluded psychiatric conditions from the definition of "injury," effectively
precluded a stress-related condition from ever being compensable under
the Act absent an accompanying physical injury or occupational disease. 51
He felt that even if stress triggers a heart attack, the attack would be
due primarily to the natural deterioration of the heart and, therefore,
non-compensable under O.R.C. § 4123.01(C)(2).5 2 Further, he stated that
"many factors contribute to heart disease, including diet, lack of exercise,
smoking, diabetes and family history. Yet, the majority invokes a rule
that employers must ultimately be responsible for the personal health
habits of their employees."5 3 Justice Wright ended by asking some ques-
tions about the parameters of the Ryan decision:
Here we have a situation where a man has been subjected
to some degree of stress which may have been a contributing
factor to a fatal heart attack. I certainly can sympathize with
anyone who has been subjected to continuing stress. However,
is it good policy to judicially legislate a policy that obviates
any possibility of defining such a claim? This claimant's death
came within a few days of the alleged stress while working at
his home. Are there any time frames which would preclude a
death claim? Are there any limits left to the parameters of an
employee's zone of employment? What have we really done as
to death claims premised upon emotional distress arising out
of dissatisfaction or boredom with one's job? 54
Since Ryan, there has been a notable lack of Ohio court decisions,
reported or unreported, dealing with mental-physical claims (now also
referred to as "Ryan" claims) and the questions raised by the dissenting
opinions of Justices Holmes and Wright. However, a 1991 case decided
by the Lucas County Court of Appeals, Kennedy v. City of Toledo,8 dfd
address a question about medical causation which arose from the syllabus
of Ryan itself.
In the first paragraph of its syllabus, Ryan held that a physical injury
occasioned solely by workplace stress is compensable under the Act. The
only issue presented by the facts of Ryan was whether physical injuries
occasioned solely by job stress were compensable. 56 But what if the job-
related stress was not the sole cause of the injury? That was the question
presented in the Kennedy case.
11 See Ryan, 503 N.E.2d at 1387 (Wright, J., dissenting).
52 Id. (Wright, J., dissenting).
53 Id. (Wright, J., dissenting).
64 Id. at 1388 (emphasis in original) (Wright, J., dissenting).
5- Kennedy v. City of Toledo, No. L-89-326, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 3377 (Lucas
County Ct. App. July 19, 1991).
,6 Ryan, 503 N.E.2d at 1380.
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In Kennedy, the worker, Richard Kennedy, was a fifteen-year police
officer with the Toledo Police Department who, in July of 1983, was
temporarily reassigned from his normal duties as a patrolman to office
duties such as clerical work, phone intake, typing, and fingerprinting.
This reassignment was due to a previous on-the-job knee injury. At trial,
Kennedy testified that he found his office duties to be tense and frus-
trating, and he feared he would lose his job. After several months at his
reassigned duties, Kennedy took a vacation upon being told he needed
to start using his accumulated vacation time. While on vacation, Kennedy
studied for his Sergeant's exam, believing that passing it was required
to remain on the police force. On November 15, 1983, while still on va-
cation, he drove to the police academy to pick up materials needed for
the test, drove home, and suffered a heart attack which necessitated
bypass surgery.
On the issue of medical causation, Kennedy's medical expert, a Toledo
physician, testified that Kennedy's unfamiliarity with his temporary of-
fice duties was extremely stressful and upsetting to Kennedy, but that
Kennedy also had a paranoid personality.5 7 This physician's opinion was
that the job stress Kennedy experienced combined with other factors of
hypertension, smoking, diabetes, obesity, and a family history of heart
disease to cause the heart attack. However, Kennedy's expert could not
say that the job stress, by itself, was the proximate cause of the heart
attack. The defense's medical expert testified that Kennedy's heart attack
was not caused by any stress which Kennedy may have experienced due
to his job reassignment. 58
After hearing the evidence, the jury returned a verdict for Kennedy,
allowing him the right to workers' compensation benefits for his heart
attack. The Industrial Commission of Ohio appealed, contending that
Ryan allows such an injury only if workplace stress was the sole cause
of the injury.59 The Commission also contended that the job stress which
Kennedy experienced was not unusual, as Ryan requires, but was merely
an exaggerated response to stress which all workers occasionally expe-
rience 60
In response to the Commission's arguments, the Lucas County Court
of Appeals held that the word "solely" in the Ryan syllabus is permissive
and does not impose a requirement that a claimant prove that the injury
resulted from workplace stress alone.6 1 Thus, the court ruled that when
job stress combines with other factors to produce a physical injury, each
factor is a proximate cause of the injury. The court also held that the jury
could have reasonably concluded that the stress experienced by Kennedy
was unusual.6' Therefore, the court upheld the jury verdict for Kennedy.
'
7 Kennedy No. L-89-316, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 3377, at *7.
Id. at *8-9.
9 ld. at *9.
10Id. at * 10.
61 Id. at *3.
r2 Kennedy, No. L-89-326, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 3377, at *19.
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This issue of what constitutes "unusual" stress under Ryan was recently
discussed in an opinion by Judge Stuart Friedman of the Cuyahoga
County Court of Common Pleas in Hall v. Gould Ocean Systems. 63 The
worker, Delores Hall, was required to take and pass an annual three-day
soldering test. Hall had pre-existing peptic ulcer disease, and while taking
the test in 1988 suffered gastrointestinal bleeding which prevented her
from completing it. In granting summary judgment to Hall's employer,
the court ruled that because Hall's co-workers were also required to take
the annual test and because the co-workers were anxious and upset during
the test, Hall's injury resulted from her own response to stress of the test,
not the test itself.64 Thus, in deciding this question of "unusual" stress,
the court compared the stress experienced by Hall to that experienced by
Hall's own co-workers.
65
The Kennedy and Hall cases illustrate that questions raised by the
dissenting opinions in Ryan remain unanswered. For instance, how can
job stress be separated from all other possible sources of stress in the
worker's life and identified as a proximate cause of the claimed physical
injury? And what kind of evidence is needed to prove the requirement of
"unusual" stress? In the end, these questions may simply be left for the
triers of fact to determine on a case-by-case basis. However, counsel for
the respective parties in a mental-physical claim should investigate
whether there are co-workers with similiar jobs and, if so, what their
responses were to the stress at issue.
VI. MENTAL-MENTAL CLAIMS
While Ryan allows a physical injury caused solely by mental job stress
to be compensable under the Act, the Supreme Court of Ohio has never
decided the question whether a purely mental condition caused by mental
job stress can be compensable, either as an injury or an occupational
disease. 66 However, as previously noted, the court now has before it two
Hall v. Gould Ocean Systems, No. 194730 (Cuyahoga County C.P. Oct. 31,
1991).6 Id.
- Id. See also Blanton v. Churchill's Supermarkets, Inc., No. L-87-089 (Lucas
County Ct. App. Nov. 6, 1987). In that case, the court concluded that the worker,
a night cashier who observed a customer with a gun, was subjected to greater
emotional stress than other workers similarly situated. Note that both the Hall
and Blanton courts judged the degree of stress by comparing the worker at issue
to other workers with the same or similiar jobs instead of all workers, as Ryan
requires. The appellate court in Kennedy, however, did not disturb the jury's
decision on this issue, stating only that "reasonable minds could conclude that
the stress experienced by [Kennedy] was not the same stress 'to which all workers
are occasionally subjected."' Kennedy, No. L-89-326 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 3377,
at *19.
But see Kerans v. Porter Paint Co., 575 N.E.2d 428 (Ohio 1991). There the
Supreme Court of Ohio held that the Ohio Workers' Compensation statutes are
not the exclusive remedy for claims based upon sexual harassment in the work-
place. In dictum, the court stated:
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companion cases, Rambaldo v. Accurate Die Casting and Rini v. City of
East Cleveland, which present the issue of whether a worker can file a
mental-mental claim as an occupational disease.6 7 In both of these cases,
the Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals held that the definition of "oc-
cupational disease" in O.R.C. § 4123.68 does not preclude compensation
for purely psychiatric conditions and permits a worker to file a claim for
such a condition. These holdings marked the first time that an Ohio
appellate court squarely held that a purely mental condition due solely
to mental job stress could be compensable under the Act, either as an
injury or an occupational disease.r-
By amending the definition of "injury" in 1986 to exclude psychiatric
conditions, the Ohio legislature has precluded the compensability of a
mental-mental claim filed as an injury. Moreover, after Ryan was decided,
a number of Ohio appellate courts addressed the issue of compensability
of mental-mental claims filed as "injury" claims prior to the 1986 legis-
lative amendment. These courts unanimously held that such claims did
not qualify as injuries under O.R.C. § 4123.01(C), which then defined
"injury" as "any injury, whether caused by external accidental means or
accidental in character and result, received in the course of, and arising
out of, the injured employee's employment. ' ' 69 Compensability was denied
Since this court's ruling in Ryan, supra, the legislature has not amended
the definition of "injury" in R.C. 4123.01(C) to include psychiatric ailments
resulting solely from stressful workplace conditions. In fact, R.C. 4123.01(C)
now specifically states that "injury does not include * * * pyschiatric con-
ditions except where the conditions have arisen from an injury or occupa-
tional disease." In light of this limitation, we are not prepared to assume
that psychological disturbances arising solely from emotional stress in the
workplace fit within the definition of "injury" in R.C. 4123.01.
Id. at 431 (footnote omitted).67 Rambaldo v. Accurate Die Casting, No. 58588 (Cuyahoga County Ct. App.
June 20, 1991), motion to certify overruled, 62 Ohio St. 3d 1456 (1991), reh'g
granted, 579 N.E.2d 1394 (1991); Rini v. City of East Cleveland, No. 58589 (Cuy-
ahoga County Ct. App. June 27, 1991), motion to certify overruled, 579 N.E.2d
1394, reh'g granted, 579 N.E.2d 1394 (1991).
68 Compare Swain v. Western-Southern Inc. Co., No. 14845, (Summit County
Ct. App. Apr. 10, 1991). In Swain, the worker filed an occupational disease claim
described as "a nervous condition of the mind" after being accosted on two separate
occasions. There was some indication that the worker was physically attacked on
these occasions and thereby sustained physical injuries. The court of appeals
overturned the trial court's order of summary judgment against the worker. See
also Allen v. Goodyear Aerospace, 468 N.E.2d 779 (1984). In Allen, the worker
filed an occupational disease claim for "situational stress, labile hypertension,
and functional gastrointestinal stress" allegedly due to pressure from supervisors.
Id. at 780. The trial court granted summary judgment against the worker, but
the appellate court reversed, declining to say that a disability caused by job stress
cannot be compensable under any circumstances as an occupational disease. See
id. at 781.
19 Hayes v. City of Toledo, 577 N.E.2d 379 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989), motion to
certify overruled, 542 N.E.2d 351 (1989); Harover v. Norwood, 534 N.E.2d 88 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1988), appeal dismissed, 546 N.E.2d 931 (1989); Wolf v. Northmont City
Sch., 528 N.E.2d 589 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987), motion to certify overruled, No. 87-
1470 (Nov. 18., 1987); Mettes v. Transamerica Ins. Corp., 521 N.E.2d 1138 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1987), motion to certify overruled, No. 87-1083 (Sept. 30, 1987); Currier
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whether the stress causing the mental condition arose from a sudden,
unexpected event 70 or gradual workplace stress.71 The reasons generally
given by the appellate courts for denying these claims were that the Act
historically had never compensated mental-mental claims and that Ryan
had not removed the need for the existence of a physical injury to receive
compensation under the Act.
This historical precedent was disregarded by the Cuyahoga County
Court of Appeals in the Rambaldo and Rini cases, however. In Rambaldo,
the worker filed an occupational disease claim alleging that, as a result
of his employment as an industrial relations director, he contracted a
disease described as "major depression and mixed personality disorder
with narcissistic and obsessive features."72 This claim was filed prior to
the 1986 amendment to O.R.C. § 4123.01(C) excluding psychiatric con-
ditions from the definition of "injury." In Rini, the worker filed an oc-
cupational disease claim for "severe generalized anxiety disorder,"
alleging that such condition was acquired from the performance of his
duties as an officer in the East Cleveland fire department. 73 The claim in
Rini was filed after the 1986 legislative amendment to the definition of
"injury.
Both the Rambaldo and Rini claims were denied administratively by
the Industrial Commission of Ohio. Both workers appealed to the court
of common pleas. The common pleas court dismissed each of these com-
plaints for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. In
both cases, the worker then appealed to the Cuyahoga County Court of
Appeals, which heard the appeals as companion cases.
v. Roadway Express, No. CA-879 (Ashland County Ct. App. June 24, 1987); Lengel
v. Griswold, No. 53054 (Cuyahoga County Ct. App. Nov. 25, 1987), motion to
certify overruled, No. 88-189 (March 23, 1988); Fields v. City of Youngstown, No.
88 CA 89 (Mahoning County Ct. App. May 30, 1989), motion to certify overruled,
545 N.E.2d 901 (1989); Neil v. Mayfield, No. 10881 (Montgomery County Ct. App.
July 22, 1988); Rinehart v. Mayfield, No. 10088 (Montgomery County Ct. App.
Mar. 3, 1987), motion to certify overruled No. 87-777 (July 15, 1987).
701n Hayes v. City of Toledo, 577 N.E.2d 379,379 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989), the
worker was a police officer who accidentally shot her commanding officer at roll
call and during weapons' inspection, resulting in posttraumatic stress disorder.
In Fields v. City of Youngstown, No. 88CA89 (Mahoning County Ct. App. May
30, 1989), the worker was a police officer who developed a posttraumatic stress
disorder after a struggle with a suspect in which the suspect was killed. In Neil
v. Mayfield, No. 10881 (Montgomery County Ct. App. July 22, 1988), the worker
suffered depression after the backhoe he was operating suddenly lurched, causing
the bucket to strike and kill a fellow worker. In Currier v. Roadway Express, No.
CA-879 (Ashland County Ct. App. June 24, 1987), the worker was a truck driver
who developed a depressive neurosis from his vehicle's involvement in a near-
miss highway accident.
71 In Harover v. Norwood, 534 N.E.2d 88 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) a police com-
munications officer claimed to have sustained a complete mental breakdown from
his job. In Wolf v. Northmont City Sch., 528 N.E.2d 589 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987), a
janitor claimed to have sustained a posttraumatic stress disorder from verbal and
psychological harassment by a school principal.
72Rambaldo, No. 58588, slip op. at 1.
73 Rini, No. 58589, slip op. at 2.
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In each case, the court of appeals reversed the trial court's dismissal
by a two-one decision. The majority opinion in both cases noted that while
the definition of "injury" now excludes psychiatric conditions, there is no
such express limitation in the definition of "occupational disease" in
O.R.C. § 4123.68.14 Consequently, the majority distinguished all of the
previous Ohio appellate cases considering mental-mental claims filed as
injuries. The majority concluded that because O.R.C. § 4123.68 does not
prevent compensation for mental conditions, and because the claims were
filed as occupational disease claims, the complaints stated valid claims
for relief. By so holding, the court thus gave a literal reading and inter-
pretation to the statutory definition of occupational disease. In contrast,
the dissenting opinion in each of these cases, written by Judge Blanche
Krupansky, contended that the mere filing of these claims as occupational
diseases rather than injuries "is a distinction without a difference."76 The
Supreme Court of Ohio must now decide whether a mental-mental claim
can be compensable under the Act as an occupational disease.
Should Ohio recognize mental-mental claims? The balance of this sec-
tion will examine this question by first looking at how other jurisdictions
have dealt with this issue and then presenting opposing arguments for
compensability.
A. Other Jurisdictions
Other states vary widely in their approaches to mental-mental claims.
Until recently, many workers' compensation acts have not specifically
addressed the issue of the compensability of purely mental conditions.
Courts have struggled with this topic and are more reluctant to allow
mental-mental claims than physical-mental and mental-physical
claims.
76
14 This is true for the definition of "occupational disease" in O.R.C. § 4123.68
both before and after the 1986 legislative amendments. See supra note 18.
15 Rambaldo v. Accurate Die Casting, No. 58588 (Cuyahoga County Ct. App.
June 20, 1991) (Krupansky, J., dissenting); Rini v. City of East Cleveland, No.
58589 (Cuyahoga County Ct. App. June 27, 1991) (Krupansky, J., dissenting).
71 In McGarrah v. SAIF, 675 P.2d 159, 161 (Or. 1983) the Oregon Supreme
Court stated:
It seems that no problem in recent years has given courts and commissions
administering workers' compensation more difficulty than on-the-job men-
tal stress which results in either emotional or physical illness. The causal
relationship between employment stress and a resulting mental or emo-
tional disorder presents one of the most complex issues in workers' com-
pensation law.
See Darnell v. North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau, 450 N.W. 2d 721
(N.D. 1990); see also, Thomas S. Cook, Workers' Compensation and Stress Claims:
Remedial Intent and Restrictive Application, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 879 (1986-
87); Lawrence Joseph, The Causation Issue in Workers' Compensation Mental
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This judicial reluctance is easily explained. The precise cause of most
mental disorders remains unknown, 77 thereby making proof of medical
causation difficult, if not impossible. Diagnosis often depends on subjec-
tive complaints of the worker rather than objective measurement.78 What
is stressful and debilitating to one worker may not be to another.7 9 Fur-
77 The Supreme Court of Alaska aptly summarized this problem in Fox v.
Alascom, Inc., 718 P.2d 977 (Alaska 1986):
There is an inherent difficulty, however, in determining whether a mental
disorder "arises out of' employment. The problem is simply that "the body
of knowledge regarding mental or emotional injuries is not certain enough
to make rational determinations as to the true nature, extent and cause of
injury." S. Sersland, Mental Disability Caused by Mental Stress: Standards
of Proof in Workers' Compensation Cases, 33 DRAKE L. REV. 751, 752 (1983-
84).
Id. at 980. Another commentator put it this way:
The precise etiology of most mental disorders is inexplicable. Mental
disorders result from an extraordinarily complex interrelation between an
individual's internal or subjective reality and his external or environmental
reality ... The precise psychogenesis of an individual's subjective reality
is impossible to determine. Moreover, the interrelation between subjective
and environmental realities is so profoundly complex that no method exists
either to quantify or qualify the extent to which one reality and not the
other is a cause of mental disorder. Therefore, the time lapse between an
external stress and the manifestation of mental disorder symptoms, and the
intensity, suddenness, or gradualness of the external symptoms are irrel-
evant in determining cause ... When mental disorder symptoms appear in
parts of the body other than the brain, medical science is able, in most cases,
to attach a quantitative or qualitative etiological probability. Scientists
cannot make this determination, however, when the symptoms manifest
themselves subjectively. An individual who suffers a mental disorder has
an a priori personal subjective vulnerability or predisposition to the dis-
order.
Joseph, supra note 76, at 271-72. See also Sara J. Sersland, Mental Disability
Caused by Mental Stress: Standards of Proof in Workers' Compensation Cases, 33
DRAKE L. REV. 751, 752-58 (1983-84); Marilyn Cohen, Workmen's Compensation
Awards for Psychoneurotic Reactions, 70 YALE L.J. 1129 (1961); AMERICAN PSY-
CHIATRIC ASS'N DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS at
xxiii (3d ed. rev. 1987) (DSM-III-R, 1987).
71 Id. See generally Lawrence Joseph, The Causation Issue in Workers' Com-
pensation Mental Disability Cases: An Analysis, Solutions, and a Perspective, 36
VAND. L. REV. 263 (1983). Sersland, supra note 77.
79 See Nugent, supra note 7, at 241, which states:
Stress claims can create a legal quagmire for both the attorney practi-
tioner and the employee relations manager. Such cases are usually difficult
to "get a handle on" because they often involve many subjective criteria. A
situation that is stressful to one employee may not be so to another. Like-
wise, the capacity to function effectively under stressful conditions varies
greatly among individuals. Finally, the diagnosis of a psychological con-
dition sufficient to render an employee incapacitated for purposes of workers'
compensation is usually grounded on the complaints of the employee rather
than any objective criteria.
Employers fear that some employees faced with substantial occupational
stress may simply "give up" and seek workers' compensation because they
"can't cope" with their jobs anymore. Hence, employee burn-out may no
longer simply involve a person quitting to find a more compatible working
environment, but rather may entail a workers' compensation claim requir-
ing the employer and its insurer to pay for psychological counseling, re-
habilitation, and retraining, while compensating the employee for lost
wages.
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ther, workers can feign mental disabilities more easily than physical
ones.8 0 Therefore, employers' concerns about the expanding number and
cost of fradulent claims are understandable.
Despite these concerns, a majority of states now provide compensation
for mental-mental claims under certain circumstances."' However, a
strong minority of states continue to deny compensability to mental-
mental claims.8 2 One study of these claims reported by Professor Arthur
Larson showed that they are typically characterized by absence of phys-
ical injury, little lost time, low medical costs, but "a lot of litigation. 83
Virtually all are litigated.&
Courts allowing compensation for mental-mental claims have estab-
lished different tests and/or threshold standards which must be met as a
prerequisite to compensability. Some jurisdictions require the mental job
stress to be sudden or dramatic, as opposed to gradual.8 5 Other jurisdic-
tions have concluded that mental-mental claims should be treated like
any other claim for workers' compensation and are compensable if gradual
mental job stress contributed to cause the mental condition., Arizona
compares the stress experienced by the worker to that experienced by
others performing the same type of work by using the "unusual stress in
the profession" test.8 7 A number of other jurisdictions allow mental-men-
o DeVader & Giampetro-Meyer, supra note 5, at 11.
81 Larson, supra note 19, at § 42.23.
82Id.
Larson, supra note 19, at § 42.25(a).
MId.
Albanese's Case, 389 N.E.2d 83 (Mass. 1979); Jose v. Equifax, Inc., 556 S.W.2d
82 (Tenn. 1977); Gatlin v. City of Knoxville, 822 S.W.2d 587 (Tenn. 1991); Jones
v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 811 S.W.2d 516 (Tenn. 1991); Hanson Buick, Inc.
v. Chatham, 292 S.E.2d 428 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982).
Wade v. Anchorage School Dist., 741 P.2d 634 (Alaska 1987); Fox v. Alascom,
Inc., 718 P.2d 977 (Alaska 1986); Royal State Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Labor and Indus.
Relations Appeal Bd., 487 P.2d 278 (Haw. 1971); New Hampshire Supply Co. v.
Steinberg, 400 A.2d 1163 (N.H. 1979); Wolfe v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co., 330
N.E.2d 603, (N.Y. 1975); Albertson's, Inc. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd.
of State of Cal., 182 Cal. Rptr. 304 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982); Williams v. Western Elec.
Co., 429 A.2d 1063 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981); Korter v. EBI Companies,
Inc., 610 P.2d 312 (Or. Ct. App. 1980). These jurisdictions thus protect the "egg-
shell" claimant who develops a psychological disability from the normal day-to-
day stresses of work. The rationale for protecting these workers under this type
of standard was summarized by the Hawaii Supreme Court in the Royal State
case:
In today's highly competitive world it cannot be doubted that people often
succumb to mental pressures resulting from their employment. These dis-
abilities are as much a cost of the production process as physical injuries.
The humanitarian purposes of the Workmen's Compensation Law require
that indemnification be predicated not upon the label assigned to the injury
received, but upon the employee's inability to work because of impairments
flowing from the conditions of his employment.
Royal State, 487 P.2d at 282 (footnote omitted).
8I Sloss v. Industrial Comm'n, 588 P.2d 303 (Ariz. 1978); Fireman's Fund Ins.
Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 579 P.2d 555 (Ariz. 1978); Motorola, Inc. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 608 P.2d 788 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980).
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tal claims if the worker proves that the mental job stress, whether gradual
or sudden, was "greater... than the day-to-day mental stress and tensions
which all employees must experience."88 The Michigan Supreme Court
even adopted an "honest perception" test, allowing compensability if the
worker honestly, even though mistakenly, believed that mental job stress
caused a mental condition. 9 Pennsylvania has developed a standard of
"abnormal working conditions," requiring the worker to prove with ob-
jective evidence that the mental injury is other than a subjective reaction
to normal working conditions.90 These differing standards most likely
stem from the inherent difficulty in assessing the causal relationship
between mental disorders and workplace stress. With the exception of
Michigan, these jurisdictions have attempted to fashion an objective way
11 Townsend v. Maine Bureau of Public Safety, 404 A.2d 1014, 1019 (Me. 1979),
modified, Caron v. Maine School Administrative District No. 27, 594 A.2d 560
(Me. 1991); see also Fought v. Stuart C. Irby, Co. 523 So. 2d 314 (Miss. 1988);
Smith & Sanders, Inc. v. Peery, 473 So. 2d 423 (Miss. 1985); Rega v. Kaiser
Aluminum and Chemical Corp., 475 A.2d 213 (R.I. 1984); Seitz v. L&R Industries,
Inc., 437 A.2d 1345 (R.I. 1981); McWhorter v. South Carolina Dept. of Ins., 165
S.E.2d 365 (S.C. 1969); Swiss Colony, Inc. v. Dept. of Industry, Labor & Human
Relations, 240 N.W.2d 128 (Wis. 1976); Consolidated Freightways v. Drake, 678
P.2d 874 (Wyo. 1984); Kelly's Case, 462 N.E.2d 348, (Mass. App. Ct.) aft'd, 477
N.E.2d 582 (1985).
Deziel v. Difco Laboratories, Inc., 268 N.W.2d 1 (Mich. 1978). There was,
however, a strong dissent in this case, contending that this subjective formula
ignores the requirement that the condition arise out of employment and that it
is highly unlikely that the worker's perception of causation will be anything but
employment. The dissent argued:
There is no doubt that the decision today will be a costly burden to
Michigan employers, small and large, who compete with out-of-state busi-
ness and to the consumers who absorb those costs. The concern here ex-
pressed, however, is not only for employers and consumers but for employees.
We have engaged in a seemingly inexorable march towards limiting the
hiring of workers to only those persons in the top echelon of physical and
mental condition.
While workmen's compensation costs are burgeoning, the benefits must
be spread ever more thinly among the workers to accommodate new cate-
gories of disorders (and ever more remote accidents) which cannot be
guarded against or controlled by an employer. Moreover, when businesses
close or move to another state, jobs and tax revenues are lost. When ex-
pansions of existing businesses are taken to other states, Michigan residents
lost opportunities for employment. These economic facts of life should not
be overlooked when we expand legislation by judicial fiat.
We do no service to the people of Michigan with this open-door opinion.
Id. at 27 (Coleman, J., dissenting). The Deziel test has been uniformly rejected
by the other jurisdictions allowing mental-mental claims. In 1982, the Michigan
legislature overturned the Deziel holding. See MICH. COMP. LAws § 418.301(2)
(1982). This new statute allows mental disabilities to be compensable when aris-
ing out of actual events of employment, not unfounded perceptions thereof.
10 Martin v. Ketchum, Inc., 568 A.2d 159 (Pa. 1990); Russella v. Workmen's
Compensation Appeal Bd. (Nat. Foam Systems, Inc.) 497 A.2d 290 (Pa. 1985).
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to measure something inherently subjective.91
Most of the courts ruling on the compensability of mental-mental claims
have considered such claims as "injury" claims under their respective
workers' compensation statutes. Courts which have allowed compensa-
bility generally apply a legal causation standard which requires the
worker to be exposed to stress greater than the ordinary day-to-day stress
which all workers experience. Professor Larson recommends this ap-
proach as the most straightforward and reasonable method of determining
compensability.9 2 In explaining the rationale behind this test, the Maine
Supreme Court explained:
Requiring a higher threshold level than simply the usual and
ordinary pressures that exist in any working situation would
erect an appropriate buffer between the employer and a host
of malingering claims. It would also serve to filter out a suf-
ficient number of cases so that an employer would not be thrust
into the role of a general insurer while permitting compensa-
tion in those gradual mental injury cases which "in ajust sense"
can be attributed to the conditions of employment. 93
Courts which have adopted this test require the presence of "unusual"
stress. This standard was adopted because of a reluctance to compensate
all mental-mental claims and because of the problems inherent in proving
that job stress, as opposed to other stress, was the substantial contributing
factor to the mental disorder.
9 4
Only a handful of courts have addressed the specific question of whether
a mental condition can qualify as an occupational disease under their
respective acts. These courts are split, with some allowing compensabil-
ity,95 some denying it,9 6 and some allowing for the possibility of com-
91 Regarding gradual, as opposed to sudden, mental stress, commentator Law-
rence Joseph wrote:
Nonimpact mental stresses-the gradual stresses of employment-are no
more subjective than mental stress that results from an identifiable trau-
matic event. A discernable objective event, however, a "badge of reliability,"
is not present when the alleged causal mental stimuli are gradual. Their
subjective nature, therefore, is less visibly susceptible to objective meas-
urement.
Joseph, supra note 76, at 291, n.113.
92 Larson, supra note 19, at § 42.23(b). Larson argues that the real distinction
to be made is not between sudden and gradual mental stress, but between gradual
stimuli that are sufficiently more damaging than those of everyday employment
life to satisfy the normal "arising-out-of" test, and those that are not. See also
Arthur Larson, Mental and Nervous Injury in Workmen's Compensation, 23 VAND.
L. REV. 1243 (1970).
91 Townsend v. Maine Bureau of Public Safety, 404 A.2d 1014 (Me. 1979).
Fox v. Alascom, Inc., 718 P.2d 977 (Alaska 1986).
91 McMahon v. The Anaconda Company, 678 P.2d 661 (1984); McGarrah v.
SAIF, 675 P.2d 159 (Ore. 1983).
Marable v. Singer Business Machines, 586 P.2d 1090 (N.M. 1978); Trans-
portation Ins. Co. v. Maksyn, 580 S.W.2d 334 (Texas 1979).
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pensability.97 In two jurisdictions which allow compensability, Montana
and Oregon, the courts follow a plain reading of statutory language de-
fining "occupational disease" as any disease caused by employment. In
contrast, the Texas and New Mexico courts decline to so interpret their
respective statutes defining "occupational disease."
B. Alternative Routes: The Different Avenues the Supreme
Court of Ohio Could Travel in Deciding Compensability
of Mental-Mental Claims
1. For
The strongest argument in favor of a ruling which allows mental-men-
tal claims in Ohio can be found in the statutory definition of "occupational
disease" in O.R.C. § 4123.68. That definition makes no distinction between
physical and mental diseases, and the words used by the General Assem-
bly should be construed according to their plain meaning and common
usage 8 Thus, mental-mental claims are allowable by the actual legis-
lative words. Further, there is no medically valid distinction between
physical and mental conditions, and there is no question that workplace
stress can cause real mental disorders in today's workers. If job stress is
the cause of a mental disorder in an Ohio worker and that worker meets
the requirements of O.R.C. § 4123.68, then such disorder should be com-
pensated just like any other work-related condition. To deny compensa-
bility would ignore the plain language and meaning of the statute and
work a hardship upon those workers who legitimately acquire stress-
related mental disease.
A similar situation was found in McGarrah v. SAIF, 9 decided by the
Supreme Court of Oregon in 1983. Henry McGarrah was a deputy sheriff
who was continually pressured by his superior officer to resign or quit.
The undisputed evidence showed that this pressure caused McGarrah to
sustain anxiety and depressive neurosis. He then filed a claim for an
occupational disease, then defined by Oregon statute to mean "any disease
or infection which arises out of and in the scope of the employment, and
to which an employee is not ordinarily subjected or exposed other than
during a period of regular actual employment therein." 100
17 Hennige v. Fairview Fire District, 472 N.Y.S.2d 204 (1984); Sawyer v. Pacific
Indemnity Co., 233 S.E.2d 227 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977). See also Chicago Bd. of Educ.
v. Industrial Comm'n, 523 N.E.2d 912 (Ill. Ct. App. 1988), in which it was stated:
To recognize that our occupational disease law would allow compensation
for any mental diseases and disorders caused by on-the-job stressful events
or conditions would, in the words of one court, open a floodgate for workers
who succumb to the everyday pressures of life.
Id. at 917. See also Board of Educ. of Chicago v. Industrial Comm'n, 538 N.E.2d
830 (111. Ct. App. 1989).
"I Sears v. Weimer, 55 N.E.2d 413 (Ohio 1944); Eastman v. State, 1 N.E.2d 140
(Ohio 1936); O.R.C. § 1.42.
675 P.2d 159 (Or. 1983).
'0o OR. REV. STAT. § 656.802 (1991).
21Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1992
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
Oregon's high court interpreted this statutory language as affording
compensation to workers with stress-related mental disease. In so hold-
ing, the court addressed the argument that its decision would encourage
a floodgate of claims:
The vast majority of workers, if not all, face and deal with
job stress on a daily basis. The Oregon occupational disease
statute speaks of diseases the worker is exposed to on the job,
but not ordinarily exposed to off the job. On-the-job stress is
not a disease. On-the-job events and conditions produce stress
which in turn can cause mental disorders. We recognize that
if we conclude the occupational disease law allows compensa-
tion for mental diseases and disorders caused by on-the-job
stressful events or conditions, that interpretation of the statute
may open a floodgate of claims from workers who simply cannot
mentally cope with usual working conditions. Researchers tell
us that people who suffer from psychological problems occupy
more hospital beds in the United States than those who have
a physical illness or injury. It is estimated that at any given
time between 15 and 30 percent of the general population have
diminished efficiency as a result of some type of mental or
emotional dysfunction. The legislature must have been aware
of the shift in costs from general welfare or general insurance
to workers' compensation that would occur if workers' com-
pensation provided coverage for mental and physical disorders
caused by job stress. We find no legislative words nor any evi-
dence of legislative intent to indicate that the legislature either
intended or did not intend to place that burden on the workers'
compensation system. 10
The Oregon court went on to state that it presumed most stress claims
are made in good faith and that if the legislature wished to exclude mental
disorders from coverage, then it may freely amend the statute to do so.
The court held that mental conditions are compensable as occupational
diseases if the worker proved that (1) the stressful conditions were real,
not imaginary, and objectively existed on the job and (2) the employment
conditions, when compared to non-employment conditions, were the "ma-
jor contributing cause" of the mental disorder. 0 2
In allowing compensability, Ohio's high court could also point to the
instruction of O.R.C. § 4123.95, which requires the terms of Ohio's Act
to be liberally construed in favor of the worker. Moreover, in 1986 the
Ohio legislature did amend the definition of "injury" to exclude mental
conditions, but refrained from making the same restriction in the defi-
nition of "occupational disease." This omission of a specific exclusion for
mental conditions in the separate statute pertaining to occupational dis-
eases may be viewed by the court as evidence of the legislature's specific
intent to allow compensability to mental disease.
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2. Against
Opponents of mental-mental claim compensation in Ohio argue that
the General Assembly, by amending the definition of "injury" in 1986 to
exclude psychiatric conditions, specifically intended to eliminate mental-
mental conditions from coverage under the Act. Prior to 1986, mental-
mental claims were being filed as injuries rather than occupational dis-
eases; therefore, the legislature had no need to consider the exclusion of
psychiatric conditions from the definition of "occupational disease." A
judicial decision allowing mental-mental claims to be filed as occupational
diseases might very well result in all mental-mental claims being labelled
and filed as "occupational diseases," thereby circumventing the 1986 leg-
islative amendment to the definition of "injury" and rendering that
amendment meaningless. The real object of judicial investigation in the
construction of a statute is to give effect to the intent of the legislature's
action. 10 3 Therefore, the Ohio Supreme Court may conclude that the only
reasonable judicial approach is to give effect to the meaning of that which
the legislature did enact; to do otherwise would violate the rule against
absurd results.104
In denying compensability, the Ohio Supreme Court may be persuaded
by those jurisdictions denying coverage to mental-mental claims on the
ground that physical conditions are identifiable and traceable, whereas
mental conditions, being related to such factors as worry, anxiety, pres-
sure, and family history, are not. Mental conditions are simply incapable
of objective measurement, and the judicial allowance of such claims in
Ohio may open the floodgates to countless numbers of claims with un-
solvable problems of definition and causation. The court could rationally
decide that these burdens, plus the added financial burdens of higher
workers' compensation premiums and litigation costs, should not be
placed upon Ohio's employers without a specific legislative amendment
to the definition of "occupational disease" including mental conditions
resulting solely from workplace stress.
The Ohio Supreme Court could deny compensability to mental-mental
claims by holding that the Ohio legislature, in its 1986 amendment to
the definition of "injury," stated its clear purpose to eliminate all mental-
mental claims from workers' compensation coverage. Although the def-
inition of "occupational disease" was changed in 1986, the new definition
did not contain a specific exclusion for psychiatric conditions. The court,
however, could reason that this change merely codified the tripartite test
set forth by the syllabus of State, ex rel. Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Krise.105 In
103 Slingluff v. Weaver, 64 N.E. 574 (Ohio 1902); Henry v. Central Natl. Bank,
242 N.E.2d 342 (Ohio 1968).
104 State, ex rel. Haines v. Rhodes, 151 N.E.2d 716 (Ohio 1958), paragraph two
of the syllabus, which states: "The General Assembly is presumed not to intend
any ridiculous or absurd results from the operation of a statute which it enacts,
and, if reasonably possible to do so, statutes must be construed so as to prevent
such results."
105 527 N.E.2d 756 (Ohio 1975).
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Krise, the court did not concern itself with a claim for a mental condition,
nor did it discuss whether such a condition would qualify as an occupa-
tional disease. Thus, the court would agree that to assume that the leg-
islature, by adopting the Krise test, also meant to include mental
conditions within the coverage of the Act is an unwarranted assumption,
especially when the legislature at the same time expressly excluded psy-
chiatric conditions from the definition of "injury." Moreover, the legis-
lative silence or inaction regarding the enactment of a similar exclusion
to the definition of "occupational disease" could not be soundly interpreted
to mean that the legislature intended mental-mental claims to be com-
pensable under O.R.C. § 4123.68.106
C. Leave it to the Legislature
At the very least, the legislature's exclusion of mental conditions from
compensability as injuries shows an intent to preclude compensation for
such conditions. However, if there is some question as to whether the
legislature intended the present definition of "occupational disease" to
impose upon employers liability for employees' mental conditions result-
ing from workplace stress, the Supreme Court of Ohio may deny com-
pensability by ruling that this question should be presented to the
legislature for its determination. To do so would allow for proper debate
on this issue of public policy.10 7 On the other hand, a judicial decision in
either Rambaldo or Rini allowing compensability for mental-mental
claims under O.R.C. § 4123.68 will construe this statute in a manner
probably not intended by the General Assembly.
In an analogous case, the Supreme Court of Minnesota declined to afford
compensation to a mental-mental claim in Lockwood v. Independent
School District No. 877.101 In that case, the worker was the principal of
106 See State v. Parrish, 465 N.E.2d 873 (Ohio 1984); Roosevelt Properties Co.
v. Kinney, 465 N.E.2d 421 (Ohio 1984); Oliver v. Kaiser Community Found, 449
N.E.2d 938, 941, 942 (Ohio 1983) ("Legislative inaction is a weak reed upon which
to lean in determining legislative intent.") (quoting with approval, Berry v. Bran-
ner, 421 P.2d 996, 998 (Or. 1966)).
,01 See Nugent, supra note 7, at 251, stating:
The legislative forum provides a more favorable environment within
which to weigh all competing interests when dealing with the issues in-
volved in the compensability of stress claims. The very nature of case law
requires a court to make policy decisions within the confines of a limited,
and sometimes unique, set of facts. On the other hand, lawmakers have the
opportunity to hold public hearings, conduct studies, and consider the in-
terests of all affected parties before arriving at a solution to the problem.
In addition, the nature of precedent is such that courts are reluctant to
overrule prior decisions. Legislatures, on the other hand, are more apt to
amend statutes that have not proved effective in carrying out legislative
intent.
log 312 N.W.2d 924 (Minn. 1981).
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a senior high school who claimed to have acquired a mental disease from
job stress. The issue before the court was whether a mental injury caused
by job-related stress without physical trauma was compensable under the
Minnesota Workers' Compensation Act, which then afforded compensa-
tion to "personal injury," defined as "injury arising out of and in the course
of employment and includes personal injury caused by occupational dis-
ease." 10 9 In denying coverage to this claim, the court explained:
We are unable to determine, however, whether the legisla-
ture in enacting the present law intended to impose on em-
ployers liability for compensation for an employee's disabling
mental condition resulting from work-related mental stress.
Under the prior law no employee had claimed compensation
for such a disability, and it seems unlikely that the legislature
contemplated the possibility of such claims when it enacted the
1953 revision. Undoubtedly, sound medical opinion can often
relate mental injury to employment stresses. Until recently,
workers' compensation has not extended to such injuries, and
historically health disability insurance has provided benefits
for them. Reallocating the costs resulting from stress-related
disability between health insurance and workers' compensa-
tion insurance is a major policy determination. In the absence
of proof that the legislature considered the far-reaching ram-
ifications of extending workers' compensation coverage to em-
ployees who are mentally disabled by employment-related
stress, we decline to construe the Workers' Compensation Act
in a manner probably not intended by that body. As in Johns-
rud v. State, Dep't of Employment Services, 306 Minn. 295, 237
N.W.2d 362 (1975), the issue raised in this case involves a policy
determination which we believe should be presented to the
legislature as the appropriate policy-making body. If it wishes
to extend workers' compensation coverage to mental disability
caused by work-related mental stress without physical trauma,
it is free to articulate that intent clearly. In the absence of a
clearly expressed legislative intent on the issue, however, we
will not hold such disability to be compensable. 110
Well said, and food for thought.
109 MINN. STAT. § 176. 011, subd. 16 (1980).
110 312 N.W.2d 924; See also James Richard Fenwick v. Oklahoma State Pen-
itentiary, 792 P.2d 60 (Okla. 1990) (declining, without a legislative mandate, to
alter the rule that disability unaccompanied by physical injury is not compensable
under the Oklahoma Act.); Lather v. Huron College, 413 N.W.2d 369 (S.D. 1987)
(following Lockwood).
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VII. SUICIDE CLAIMS
What if mental stress due to either an industrial injury or workplace
stress results in suicide? Ohio's Act prohibits workers' compensation for
a purposely self-inflicted injury, occupational disease, or death."1 ' How-
ever, dependents may recover compensation for a death by suicide, pro-
vided that they satisfy a three-part test pronounced in 1991 by the
Supreme Court of Ohio in Borbely v. Prestole Everlock, Inc.1'2 By deciding
Borbely, the court changed the legal standard applied to suicide cases
since 1935. The prior standard was established by the syllabus of Indus-
trial Commission v. Brubaker.
113
The worker in Brubaker, Robert E. Brubaker, strained his hip while
lifting a box at work, and his claim for this injury was allowed. Delays
in the receipt of the compensation due him and in his return to work
caused Brubaker to worry. Within a week after the compensation award
was made, but before the check was received, Burbaker committed suicide
by shooting himself.
In denying suicide benefits to Brubaker's widow, the Supreme Court
of Ohio held:
In order for dependents to recover under the Workmen's Com-
pensation Law of Ohio for death by suicide, they must prove
by the greater weight of the evidence: First, an injury in the
course of employment; second, that the injury produced mental
derangement to the extent that the employee could not enter-
tain a fixed purpose to take his own life; and third, that the
suicide was the direct result of that lack of purpose that char-
acterizes an insane mind.
1 1 4
This three-pronged test focused upon the decedent's own understanding
of the nature and consequences of the act of suicide. The court's opinion
stated that "the mere fact of suicide presents no presumption of insan-
ity." 6 As to the second prong of the test, the court explained that "mere
mental derangement is not sufficient in a case of this character. It must
go to the extent of destroying the free moral agency of the actor and be
of such potency as to prevent him from fixing in his mind the purpose to
commit self destruction."'1 6 Thus, to recover for suicide under Brubaker,
dependents were required to show that the deceased did not know what
he or she was doing when committing suicide.
The Brubaker test required a heavy burden of proof from the dependents
of workers who had committed suicide. In recent years this test, partic-
"'O.R.C. § 4123.54.
'' 565 N.E.2d 575 (Ohio 1991).
13 196 N.E. 409 (Ohio 1935).
114 Id.
"I Id. at 410.
1,6 Id. at 411.
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ularly its "fixed purpose" standard, was criticized for being outdated and
irrelevant to the purpose of workers' compensation statutes, which is to
provide financial compensation to the victims of work-related injuries and
their families, regardless of fault. 117 At the time of the Borbely decision,
a majority of jurisdictions adopted a less stringent "chain of causation"
or "but for" test, which allowed benefits for suicide if the worker sustained
an industrial injury which caused a mental disturbance which resulted
in the suicide.""
The facts of Borbely showed that the worker received physical injuries
from two separate work incidents occurring almost three years apart. Due
to these injuries, the worker needed psychiatric treatment. About three
years after his second injury, the worker committed suicide by shooting
himself in the head. The court, in overruling the Brubaker "fixed purpose"
standard, stated why a new standard was appropriate:
In our view, simply because a person is capable of having a
fixed purpose to commit suicide does not necessarily mean that
the resulting suicide is voluntary. Thus, we believe that the
emphasis and focus on determining whether a particular sui-
cide is compensable should rest on precisely what caused the
person to commit suicide, not on the person's understanding of
the act and its consequences. 119
Based upon this rationale, the Borbely case set forth the new legal
standard in suicide cases in Ohio:
In order for dependents to recover workers' compensation
benefits for a death by suicide, they must establish by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that (1) there was initially an injury
received in the course of, and arising out of, the employee's
employment as defined by O.R.C. § 4123.01(C); (2) the work-
related injury caused the employee to become dominated by a
disturbance of the mind of such severity as to override normal
rational judgment; and (3) the disturbance resulted in the em-
ployee's suicide.1
20
The court found this new "chain-of-causation" standard more logical and
enlightened, and "most consistent with the constitutional purpose of
workers' compensation, which is to 'provide compensation to workmen
and their dependents, for death, injuries or occupational disease, occa-
sioned in the course of such workmen's employment."" '12'




"' Id. at 579.
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Returning to the hypothetical case of a worker's suicide resulting from
a mental condition caused solely by mental job stress, it appears that the
dependents of such worker would not be entitled to compensation under
Borbely. This is so because the first element of the new standard requires
a showing of an injury as defined by O.R.C. § 4123.01(C). Because such
statute specifically excludes psychiatric conditions from the definition of
"injury," the suicide must, therefore, be preceded by a work-related phys-
ical injury which then caused a mental disturbance ending in the suicide.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The subject of mental stress in the workplace is now a national issue,
being the topic of study, debate, and much litigation. In Ohio, mental
stress related to the workplace can lead to compensable workers' com-
pensation claims in certain situations. A mental condition caused by a
work-related physical condition is compensable. A physical condition due
to mental job stress is also compensable, provided that such condition
resulted from greater job stress than that occasionally experienced by all
workers.
The question of whether a mental condition caused solely by job-related
mental stress is compensable is less-clearly answered. If the worker files
a mental-mental claim as an "injury," it is not compensable. On the other
hand, if such a claim is filed as an "occupational disease," the Cuyahoga
County Court of Appeals has held that the statute defining "occupational
disease" permits compensation. Now this question whether a mental-
mental claim can be a compensable occupational disease is squarely before
the Supreme Court of Ohio. The decision will turn on whether the court
is able to determine the intent of the Ohio legislature on this issue. If
the court allows compensability, the key will be what test of legal caus-
ation is adopted. Whatever the decision, it will certainly be of interest to
all Ohio workers and employers.
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